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                                                 Short of the Goal
                                    New York=s Legislation to Compel HIV Testing
                                          from Accused Sex Offenders
                                                           By 
                                                Joseph E. Fahey1
This past November legislation came into effect which, at first blush, appeared to provide
more relief for victims of sex offenses who live with the dread that they might also have been
infected with Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV). Section 210.16 of the Criminal Procedure
Law2 was enacted3 and it provided that upon the filing of either an indictment or superior court
information, which charged an offense under Article 130 of the Penal Law 4involving@sexual
intercourse, oral sexual conduct or anal sexual conduct@ as defined in Section 130.00 of the Penal
Law the court could order the defendant to undergo HIV testing. This legislation is designed to
augment the same relief offered by Section 390.15 of the Criminal Procedure Law5 enacted four
years previously.6 That law provided for the same testing but only after conviction7 for an
offense pursuant to Article 130 in which the same conduct occurred. Indeed, a comparison of the
two sections reveals that the procedures for obtaining the testing are identical. Both provide for
the application to be filed by the victim or, where necessary, the victim=s legal representative.
Both provide that the victim must have been offered counseling by a public health officer and
advised of the limitations of the information obtained from an HIV test; current scientific
assessments of the risk of HIV from the exposure the victim experienced; and the need for the
victim to undergo HIV testing to definitively determine his or her status. Both allow the court to
order a hearing, only if necessary to determine if the applicant is the victim of the offense. Both
contain elaborate confidentiality protections for the parties concerned, and which exclude the
results of such testing from any related proceedings.
Since testing pursuant to Section 390.15 occurs only after a conviction, there is no
requirement that the victim demonstrate a particularized need for the testing. 
Under Section 210.16 the victim must demonstrate that the testing would have a medical
or psychological benefit to the victim. A medical benefit is found where A...(i) a decision is
pending about beginning, continuing or discontinuing a medical intervention for the victim
and(ii) the result of an HIV test of the defendant could affect that decision, and could provide
relevant information beyond that which could be provided by an HIV test of the victim.@8 This
section also allows for a hearing in the event a follow-up test is sought,but limits the victim to a
single follow-up test.
While the new legislation offers the victim an opportunity to obtain HIV testing earlier in
the proceedings, and the opportunity to obtain follow-up testing, it contains a number of time
limits upon the availability of this testing which seem to limit the effectiveness of the legislation
and raises a number of interesting questions.
Pursuant to  Section 390.15 the victim could seek this relief only if the defendant was
convicted of a felony or the misdemeanor of Sexual Misconduct .9 An application for such
testing must have been filed within ten days after entry of the conviction but could be extended,
for good cause, if prior to the sentence being imposed. 
Under Section 290.16, the request for such testing must be filed with the court prior to or
within forty-eight hours after the filing of an indictment or superior court information charging
an offense pursuant to Article 130 containing the types of conduct previously mentioned, but the
court could permit such a request to be filed later in the proceedings. More importantly however
under this section a request for such testing will be entertained only if it is made within six
months from the date of the offense.10  Why this enactment limits the relief being granted only
within six months of the date of the commission of the offense remains an unanswered question.
Indeed the limitation appears to further victimize those who were sexually assaulted years
earlier, and even those whose cases have been under investigation for a protracted period of
time. It could even victimize those whose prosecution has been delayed by ongoing or protracted
plea negotiations, resulting in the delay of a superior court disposition. While the section does
allow the filing of a request for the testing prior to the filing of an indictment or superior court
information, this limitation requires a prosecutor engaged in such plea discussions to be extra
vigilant, lest the right of the victim to such testing be lost. Moreover the six month limitation
appears to fly in the face of more recent DNA advances.
A review of recent cases demonstrates that the use of DNA technology has resulted in
law enforcement agencies solving many Acold@ cases. In People v. Grogan, 28 A.D. 3d [Second
Department (2006)], the Appellate Division affirmed a conviction for Rape in the First Degree
where the defendant was indicted eight years after the rape occurred, as the result of his being
identified through DNA matching. Likewise in People v. Lloyd, 23 A.D. 3d 296 [First
Department (2005)] the court  affirmed a 2004 conviction for Sodomy in the First Degree,
Sexual Abuse in the First Degree and Endangering the Welfare of a Child based upon a 1996
incident. In People v. Harrison, 22 A.D. 3d 236 (2005) it again rejected a defendant=s argument
that his speedy trial rights were violated where he was identified by the use of DNA comparisons
years after the crimes occurred. In all of these cases the courts held that the five year statute of
limitations was tolled, where authorities had exhausted all reasonable investigative measures and
the defendant=s identity and whereabouts were unknown, until the DNA technology identifying
the perpetrators was perfected. Indeed in People v. Lloyd, the court noted that this case was one
of A16,000 cold cases@ awaiting DNA comparison. Perhaps the best discussion of what the
advance of DNA technology means for the criminal justice system occurred in People v.
Martinez, 52 A.D. 3d (2008). There the First Department affirmed a defendant=s 2006 conviction
for Attempted Rape in the first Degree for an attack that occurred in 1996. Judge Acosta in the
Court=s opinion noted that in 2001 a particularized DNA sample was indicted as AJohn Doe@ by a
New York County grand jury. In 2004 the defendant was identified and the indictment was
amended to reflect his name.  In affirming the propriety of this practice, Judge Acosta observed;
AThat the indictment did not refer to the defendant by name is of no moment
inasmuch as it identified him by his unique DNA markers.@ (52 A.D. 3d 68, 71)
Amplifying this reasoning, he went on to declare;
ANothing in CPL 200.50 requires that an individual charged in an indictment be
referred to in any particular manner, and we conclude that a >John Doe= indictment
accompanied by a specific DNA profile is sufficient to give a defendaan notice of
the charges against him
Indeed given the advances in science, the practice of indicting DNA is starting to
take a foothold in this country=s justice system ( see Scott Akehurst-Moore, An
Appropriate Balance ?-a Survey and Critique of State and federal DNA
indictment and Tolling Statues, 6 high tech L. 213[2006]). Sone states have
employed non-statutory DNA indictments but in addition to the federal legislation
(18 USC3282) there are four states utilizing statutory DNA indictments. The non-
statutory states include Wisconsin, (see, State v. Dabney, 264 Wis, 2d 843, 854,
663 N.W. 2d 366, 372, [Ct. Of App. 2003]. Petition dismissed. 266 Wis 2d 63,
671 N.W. 2d 850 [2003]) and Massachusetts (see Suzanne Smalley, Newest
Suspect in Rapes: The DNA >John Doe= Indicted to Keep Cases Open, The Boston
Globe, June 20, 2004, p.1 ([ noting use of DNA indictment after legislature failed
to abolish statute of limitations for rape]). Examples of legislative implementation
of DNA indictments include Ark. Code Ann. Section 5-1-109(b)(1)(B),(i)-(j);
Del. Code Ann. Tit. 11 section 3107(a); Mich Comp. Laws Section 767.24(2)(b);
N.H. Rev Stat. Ann. Section 592-A:7(II); and 18 USC Section 3282). States in
which a genetic material has been indicted (see, Moyer & Answay, Biotechnology
and the Bar: A Response to the Growing Divide Between Science and the Legal 
Environment 22 Berkeley Tech L J 671, 688 [2007] include California, Texas,
Wisconsin, North Dakota, Pennsylvania, Oklahoma, New York, Utah , Missouri,
and Kansas (id at 689 n.95).@ (52 A.D. 3d at 72)
The Judge went on to approve the practice in the instant case, writing;
Absent a constitutional or statutory prohibition a DNA indictment is an
appropriate method to prosecute perpetrators of some of the most heinous
criminal acts. Indeed, the prevalence of DNA databanks today as a criminal
justice tool supports the conclusion that a defendant can be properly identified by
a DNA profile, especially in light of the accuracy of this identification. The
chance that a positive DNA match does not belong to the same person may be less
than one in 500 million (see Moyer &Amway, supra, 22 Berkely Tech L.J. at 684
n. 64). therefore, in the instant case, given the nature of the crime, the notice of
the charges received by the defendant was reasonable under all the circumstances@ 
(People v. Palmer, 7 A.D. 3d 472, 788 N.Y.S. 2d 144[2004], lv. Denied, 3 N.Y.
3d 710, 785 N.Y.S. 2d 38, 818 N.E. 2d 680 [2004]).
 Clearly we are at the dawn of a new age with the increasing application of DNA
technology to criminal investigations. If even a fraction of the 16,000 cold cases cited in Lloyd
supra result in identification and prosecution of rapists and sex offenders, there will be several
thousand victims who will have closure from their ordeal. Don=t these victims also deserve to
have some piece of mind about whether they were infected with the HIV virus as part of that
closure ?  If the answer is yes, as surely it should be, then this legislation needs to be amended
further.
1The author is a Judge in the New York State Court System presiding in Onondaga County
Court. He received his J.D. from Syracuse University College of Law in 1975 and an LLM in
Criminal Law from University of Buffalo Law School in 2003. He is an Adjunct Professor of
Law at Syracuse University College of Law.
2McKinney=s (2007).
3L. 2007, c. 639, effective November 1, 2007.
4McKinney=s (2004 ).
5McKinney=s (2005 ).
6L.2003,c.264, Section 44, effective November 1, 2003.
7Conviction under this section also encompassed one who was adjudicated and sentenced as a
Youthful Offender pursuant to Section 720.10 of the Criminal Procedure Law.
8Criminal Procedure Law Section 210.16(1).
9Section 130.20 of the Penal Law.
10Emphasis added.
